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Abstract. In the age of cloud computing, cloud users with a limited amount of storage can
outsource their data to remote servers. The cloud servers, in lieu of monetary benefits, offer
retrievability of their clients’ data at any point of time. A client’s data can be dynamic (or static)
in nature depending on whether the client can (or cannot) update the uploaded data as needed.
Secure cloud storage protocols enable a client to check the integrity of her outsourced data by
auditing the data. In this work, we explore the possibility of constructing a secure cloud storage
for dynamic data by leveraging the idea of secure network coding. We show that some of the
secure network coding schemes can be used to construct efficient secure cloud storage protocols
for dynamic data, and we construct such a secure cloud storage protocol (DSCS I) based on a
secure network coding protocol. To the best of our knowledge, DSCS I is the first secure cloud
storage protocol for dynamic data that is based on a secure network coding protocol and that
is secure in the standard model. Although generic dynamic data support arbitrary insertions,
deletions and modifications, append-only data find numerous applications in the real world and
have been already deployed for various log structures. Thus, we provide another construction of
a secure cloud storage protocol (DSCS II) specific to append-only data — that overcomes some
limitations of DSCS I. We compare the asymptotic performance of DSCS I and DSCS II with that
of other secure cloud storage schemes. Finally, we provide prototype implementations for DSCS I
and DSCS II in order to evaluate their performance.
Keywords: Cloud computing, secure cloud storage, network coding, dynamic data, provable data
possession, public verifiability, append-only data.
1 Introduction
With the advent of cloud computing, cloud servers offer to their clients (cloud users) various facilities
that include delegation of huge amount of computation and outsourcing large amount of data (say, in
the order of terabytes). For example, a client having a smart phone with a low-performance processor
or a limited amount of storage capacity cannot accomplish this heavy computation or store such a large
volume of data. Under such circumstances, the client can delegate her computation or storage to the
cloud server. Now, the client only has to download the result of the computation or has to read (or
update) the required portion of the uploaded data.
In case of storage outsourcing, the cloud server stores a massive volume of data on behalf of its
clients (data owners). However, a malicious cloud server can delete some of the client’s data (that are
not accessed frequently) in order to save some space. Secure cloud storage (SCS) protocols (two-party
protocols between the client and the server) provide a mechanism to detect if the client’s data are
stored untampered in the server. Depending on the nature of the data to be outsourced, secure cloud
storage protocols are classified as: SCS protocols for static data (SSCS) [4,36,56] and SCS protocols for
dynamic data (DSCS) [25,62,13,57]. For static data, the client cannot change her data after the initial
outsourcing (suitable mostly for backup or archival data). Dynamic data are more generic in that the
client can modify her data as often as needed. In SCS protocols, the client can audit her data stored on
the server without accessing the whole data file, and still, be able to detect an unwanted modification of
the data done by a malicious server. During an audit, the client typically sends some random challenge
to the server, and the server produces proofs of storage (computed on the stored data) corresponding
to that challenge. The SCS protocols are publicly verifiable if the audits can be performed by any third
party auditor (TPA) with the knowledge of public parameters only; they are privately verifiable if one
needs some secret information of the client in order to perform an audit. The entities involved in a secure
cloud storage protocol are shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. The architecture of a secure cloud storage protocol
The client processes the data file and outsources the file to the cloud server. For static data, the client can
read the outsourced data. On the other hand, for dynamic data, she can perform write operations on her data
as well. For a privately verifiable secure cloud storage protocol, the client having the secret key can perform
audits on the data (through challenge and response). In a publicly verifiable protocol, she can delegate the
auditing task to a third party auditor (TPA) who performs audits on behalf of the client.
In a network coding protocol [2,41], every intermediate node (all nodes except the source and target
nodes) in a communication network combines the incoming packets to output another packet. These
protocols enjoy much improved throughput, efficiency and scalability compared to the conventional
store-and-forward routing where an incoming packet is relayed as it is. However, these protocols are
prone to pollution attacks caused by malicious intermediate nodes that inject invalid packets in the
network. These invalid packets produce more such packets downstream. In the worst case, the target
node cannot decode the original file sent to it via the network. Secure network coding (SNC) protocols
use cryptographic primitives in order to prevent these attacks. In an SNC protocol, the source node
authenticates each of the packets to be transmitted through the network by attaching a small tag to it.
These authentication tags are generated using homomorphic message authentication codes (MACs) [1]
or homomorphic signatures [16,9,29,14]. Due to the homomorphic property of the tags, every interme-
diate node can combine the incoming packets (and their tags) to output another packet along with its
authentication tag.
In this work, we look at the problem of constructing a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic
data (DSCS) from a different perspective. We investigate whether we can construct an efficient DSCS
protocol using a secure network coding (SNC) protocol. In a previous work, Chen et al. [18] reveal
a relationship between secure cloud storage and secure network coding. In particular, they show that
one can exploit some of the procedures of a SNC protocol in order to construct a secure cloud storage
protocol for static data. However, their construction does not handle dynamic data — that makes it
insufficient in many cloud applications where a client needs to update (insert, delete or modify) her
data efficiently. Clearly, a naive way to update data is to download the whole data file, perform the
required updates and upload the file to the server again; but this procedure is highly inefficient as it
requires huge amount of communication bandwidth for every update. Thus, further investigations are
needed towards an efficient construction of a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data using a
secure network coding protocol.
We note that the network coding technique is used to construct distributed storage systems where
the client’s data are disseminated across multiple servers [21,17,40,50]. However, these storage systems
primarily aim to reduce the repair bandwidth when some of the servers fail. On the other hand, we
explore, in this work, whether we can exploit the procedures involved in a secure network coding protocol
in order to construct an efficient and secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data (for a single storage
server).
In addition to generic dynamic data, there are various practical applications where append-only data
need to be stored with a guarantee of retrievability (e.g., ledgers containing transactions, medical history
of patients and different log data files). Although secure cloud storage schemes for generic dynamic data
also work for append-only data, a more efficient solution (specific to append-only data files) would be
helpful in this scenario.
Our Contribution In this paper, we construct secure cloud storage protocols using secure network
coding (SNC) protocols. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
– We extend the work of Chen et al. [18] and explore the possibility of providing a general construction
of a DSCS protocol from any SNC protocol. We discuss the challenges for such a general construction
in details, and we identify some SNC protocols such that efficient DSCS protocols can be constructed
using them.
– We construct a DSCS protocol (DSCS I) from an SNC protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [14].
DSCS I handles dynamic data, that is, the client can efficiently perform updates (insertion, deletion
and modification operations) on her data outsourced to the cloud server. DSCS I offers public
verifiability.
– We describe the security model of a DSCS protocol and prove that DSCS I is secure in this model.
– As append-only data are a special case of generic dynamic data, we can use the same DSCS I
protocol (which is based on [14]) for append-only data. However, we identify some SNC protocols
that are not suitable for building a secure cloud storage for generic dynamic data, but efficient
secure cloud storage protocols for append-only data can be constructed from them. These secure
cloud storage protocols (specific to append-only data) are much more efficient than an SNC-based
secure cloud storage for dynamic data. We construct such a publicly verifiable secure cloud storage
protocol (DSCS II) for append-only data by using an SNC protocol proposed by Boneh et al. [9].
This construction is secure in the random oracle model and overcomes some of the limitations of
DSCS I.
– We compare the (asymptotic) performance of DSCS I and DSCS II with that of other existing secure
cloud storage protocols.
– We evaluate the performance (e.g., storage overhead, computational cost and communication cost)
of DSCS I and DSCS II by providing prototype implementations of the same. Extensive experimen-
tations are done for different sizes of data files and different update operations on these data files.
We also compare our results with that of an SNC-based secure cloud storage scheme for static data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we mention the notations we use in this
paper, and we briefly describe secure network coding protocols and secure cloud storage protocols along
with their respective security models. We identify the challenges in constructing a DSCS protocol from
an SNC protocol (in general) and discuss them in Section 3. Then, we describe our construction (DSCS
I) that is based on a secure network coding protocol. Section 4 provides the security proof of DSCS I
and the probabilistic guarantees DSCS I offers. In Section 5, we analyze the efficiency of DSCS I and
compare its performance with that of the existing secure cloud storage schemes. Section 6 describes our
second construction of a secure cloud storage (DSCS II) that deals with append-only data. We report the
experimental results based on our prototype implementations in Section 7. In the concluding Section 8,
we summarize the work done in this paper.
2 Preliminaries and Background
2.1 Notation
We take λ to be the security parameter. An algorithmA(1λ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
when its running time is polynomial in λ and its output y is a random variable which depends on the
internal coin tosses of A. An element a chosen uniformly at random from a set S is denoted as a
R
←− S.
A function f : N → R is called negligible in λ if for all positive integers c and for all sufficiently large
λ, we have f(λ) < 1
λc
. In general, F is used to denote a finite field. The multiplication of a vector v by
a scalar s is denoted by s · v. The terms “packet” and “vector” are used interchangeably in this work.
The notation “
∑
” is used to denote either a vector sum or a scalar sum (depending upon the context).
The notation “·|| · · · ||·” denotes the concatenation of multiple strings. For two integers a and b (where
a 6 b), the set {a, a+ 1, . . . , b} is denoted by [a, b] as well.
2.2 Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
A collision-resistant hash function h takes a bit-string s ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input and outputs a bit-string of
length O(λ). A family of functions H is collision-resistant if no polynomial-time (in λ) algorithm can
output, except with a probability negligible in λ, two bit-strings s1, s2 such that h(s1) = h(s2), where h
is chosen from the family H uniformly at random. We consider a single collision-resistant hash function
(e.g., SHA-256) for practical purposes.
2.3 Homomorphic Linear Authenticators (or Tags)
A homomorphic linear authenticator scheme consists of four algorithms (KeyGen, LinTag, LinAuth,
LinVer) [22,30]. The algorithm KeyGen takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs K =
(sk, pk), where sk is the secret key and pk is the corresponding public key (K consists of only sk in
the private verification setting). For a finite field F and a vector of messages x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn] ∈ F
n,
the algorithm LinTagsk(x) produces a vector of authenticators (or tags) s = [σ1, σ2, . . . , σn]. Given x, s
and a vector of coefficients c = [c1, c2, . . . , cn] ∈ F
n, the algorithm LinAuth computes a single tag σ for
µ =
∑
i∈[1,n] cixi (due to the homomorphic property, the tag σ corresponds to the combined message
µ). The algorithm LinVer takes as input pk (or sk for private verification), c, µ and σ, and it outputs
accept or reject depending upon whether σ is a valid tag for µ or not. There are several constructions
of homomorphic linear authenticators using homomorphic message authentication codes (MACs) [1] and
homomorphic signatures [16,9,14].1
2.4 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1 and g2 be generators of the
groups G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear map (or pairing) [37,28] is a function e : G1×G2 → GT such
that:
1. for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(u
a, vb) = e(u, v)ab (bilinear property),
2. e is non-degenerate, that is, e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
Furthermore, properties 1 and 2 imply that
3. for all u1, u2 ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, we have e(u1 · u2, v) = e(u1, v) · e(u2, v).
2.5 Secure Network Coding
A computer network consists of sender (or source) nodes, receiver (or target) nodes and intermediate
nodes (or routers). Sender nodes send packets to the target nodes through the network. In the conven-
tional store-and-forward routing, intermediate nodes copy the incoming packets and send them to their
respective neighbors. Ahlswede et al. [2] introduce network coding as an alternative to the store-and-
forward routing in a network. Here, each intermediate node has computational power, and it encodes
the incoming packets to form an output packet. We provide an overview of linear network coding pro-
posed by Li et al. [41], where each intermediate node in the network outputs a linear combination of
the packets it receives.
A sender node sends packets to the receiver nodes through the network. Each intermediate node
present in the network encodes the incoming packets to form an output packet and transmits this
output packet to its neighbors. We assume that each packet is a vector and each component of such a
vector is an element of a finite field F. Let a sender node have to transmit a file that can be viewed
as set of m vectors v1, v2, . . . , vm, where each vi ∈ F
n for i ∈ [1,m]. For each i ∈ [1,m], the sender
node augments the vector vi to form another vector ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m, where ei is the m-dimensional
unit vector containing 1 in the i-th position and 0 in others. Thus, the collection of these m augmented
vectors can be illustrated as

—u1—
—u2—
...
—um—

 =


—v1— —e1—
—v2— —e2—
...
...
—vm— —em—

 =


v11 v12 · · · v1n 1 0 · · · 0
v21 v22 · · · v2n 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
vm1 vm2 · · · vmn 0 0 · · · 1

 .
1 Digital signatures and MACs are described in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
Fig. 2. Linear combination of input packets for an intermediate node
The sender transmits these augmented vectors (or packets) to the network. Let V ⊂ Fn+m be the
linear subspace spanned by u1, u2, . . . , um. A random file identifier fid is associated with the file (or
the subspace V ). An intermediate node in the network outputs a linear combination of the received
packets. In random (linear) network coding [34,33], the coefficients of these linear combinations are
chosen uniformly at random from the field F. An intermediate node in the network, upon receiving l
packets y1, y2, . . . , yl ∈ F
n+m, chooses l coefficients ν1, ν2, . . . , νl
R
←− F and outputs another packet w ∈
F
n+m such that w =
∑l
i=1 νi · yi (as shown in Figure 2). Thus, the output packet for each intermediate
node is of the form
w = [w1, w2, . . . , wn, c1, c2, . . . , cm] ∈ V,
where c1, c2, . . . , cm ∈ F and wj =
∑m
i=1 civij for each j ∈ [1, n]. Finally, when the receiver node
accumulates m linearly independent vectors, it solves a system of linear equations to obtain the original
file destined to it.
A network coding protocol is vulnerable to pollution attacks, where a malicious intermediate node
injects an invalid packet to the network and this invalid packet in turn pollutes multiple packets down-
stream. In a secure network coding (SNC) protocol, an authentication information (or tag) is attached
to each packet. Every node can combine the incoming packets linearly to output another packet along
with its authentication tag. Both the incoming packets and the output packet belong to the same linear
subspace V . The authentication tags are computed using homomorphic message authentication codes
(MACs) [1] or homomorphic signatures [16,9,29,6,14]. The homomorphic property of these tags enables
an intermediate node to aggregate (or combine) the tags of the incoming packets in order to output a
tag for the outgoing packet. In an SNC protocol based on homomorphic signatures, every node in the
network can verify the authenticity of its incoming packets. On the other hand, in case of SNC protocols
based on homomorphic MACs, it requires the knowledge of the secret key to verify an incoming packet.
We define a secure network coding (SNC) protocol as follows [14]. The values of m (the dimension of
the linear subspace V ⊂ Fn+m to sign) and n (the dimension of a vector before augmenting) are input
to the procedures involved in the protocol.
Definition 1 (Secure Network Coding). A secure network coding (SNC) protocol consists of the
following procedures.
– SNC.KeyGen(1λ,m, n): The sender runs this procedure in order to generate a secret key-public key
pair K = (sk, pk).
– SNC.TagGen(V, sk,m, n, fid): On input a linear subspace V ⊂ Fn+m, the secret key sk and a random
file identifier fid associated with V , the sender runs this procedure to produce an authentication tag
t for V .
– SNC.Combine({yi, ti, νi}16i6l, pk,m, n, fid): Given l incoming packets y1, y2, . . . , yl ∈ F
n+m and
their corresponding tags t1, t2, . . . , tl for a file associated with fid, an intermediate node chooses l
random coefficients ν1, ν2, . . . , νl
R
←− F and runs this procedure. The procedure outputs another packet
w ∈ Fn+m and its authentication tag t such that w =
∑l
i=1 νi · yi.
– SNC.Verify(w, t, K¯,m, n, fid): Given a packet w and its tag t for a file associated with fid, an
intermediate node or the receiver node executes this procedure. This procedure returns 1 if t is a
valid tag for the packet w; it returns 0, otherwise.
For some SNC protocols [9,29,14], the procedure SNC.Verify requires only the public key pk (i.e.,
K¯ = pk). For other SNC protocols [1], the knowledge of the secret key sk is necessary to verify the
incoming packets (i.e., K¯ = sk).
Security of an SNC Protocol We consider the following security game between a challenger and a
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A [14].
– Setup The adversary A provides the values m and n of its choice to the challenger. The challenger
runs SNC.KeyGen(1λ,m, n) to output K = (sk, pk) and returns pk to A.
– Queries Let q be a polynomial in λ. The adversary A adaptively chooses a sequence of q vector
spaces Vi ⊂ F
n+m defined by respective augmented basis vectors {ui1, ui2, . . . , uim} and asks the
challenger to authenticate the vector spaces. For each 1 6 i 6 q, the challenger chooses a random
file identifier fidi from a predefined space, generates an authentication tag ti for Vi by running
SNC.TagGen(Vi, sk,m, n, fidi) and gives ti to A.
– Forgery The adversary A outputs (fid∗,w∗, t∗).
Let the adversary A output the vector w∗ = [w∗1 , w
∗
2 , . . . , w
∗
n+m] ∈ F
n+m. Then, the adversary A
wins the security game mentioned above if: [w∗n+1, w
∗
n+2, . . . , w
∗
n+m] ∈ F
m is not equal to the all-zero
vector 0m, SNC.Verify(w∗, t∗, pk,m, n, fid∗) = 1 and one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. fid∗ 6= fidi for all i ∈ [1, q] (type-1 forgery)
2. fid∗ = fidi for some i ∈ [1, q], but w
∗ 6∈ Vi (type-2 forgery).
For a secure network coding (SNC) protocol, the probability that the adversary A wins the security
game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
We note that the security game for a secure network coding protocol based on homomorphic MACs
is same as the game described above, except that the procedure SNC.KeyGen now produces a secret key
only (unknown to A) and the verification procedure SNC.Verify requires the knowledge of this secret
key.
2.6 Secure Cloud Storage
Clients (cloud users) may want to outsource their huge amount of data to the cloud storage server. As
the cloud service provider (possibly malicious) might discard old data to save some space, the clients
need to be convinced that the outsourced data are stored untampered by the cloud server. A naive
approach to ensure data integrity is that a client downloads the whole data from the server and verifies
the integrity of the data file. However, this process is inefficient in terms of communication bandwidth
required.
Provable Data Possession (PDP) Researchers come up with proofs of storage in order to resolve
the issue mentioned above. Ateniese et al. [4] introduce the concept of provable data possession (PDP)
where the client splits the data file into blocks, computes an authentication tag (for example, MAC)
for each block of the file, and uploads the blocks along with the authentication tags. During an audit
protocol, the client samples a predefined number of random block-indices (challenge) and sends them
to the server. We denote the cardinality of the challenge set by l which is typically taken to be O(λ).
The server does some computations (depending upon the challenge) over the stored data, and sends a
proof (response) to the client who verifies the integrity of her data based on this proof. This scheme also
introduces the notion of public verifiability2 where the client (data owner) can delegate the auditing
2 The term “public verifiability” discussed in this paper denotes (only) whether a third party auditor having
the knowledge of the public parameters can perform an audit on behalf of the client (data owner). Following
this notion of “public verifiability”, there are schemes which are publicly verifiable [4,25,62,59,18]. We mention
that this notion implicitly assumes that the client is honest. However, a malicious client can publish incorrect
public parameters in order to get an honest server framed by a third party auditor [38].
task to a third party auditor (TPA). Then, the TPA with the knowledge of the public key performs an
audit. For privately verifiable schemes, only the client having knowledge of the secret key can verify the
proof sent by the server. Other schemes achieving PDP include [5,25,62,59,27].
Proofs of Retrievability (POR) The first paper introducing proofs of retrievability (POR) for static
data is by Juels and Kaliski [36] (a similar idea is given for sublinear authenticators by Naor and
Rothblum [47]). According to Shacham and Waters [56], the underlying idea of a POR scheme is to
encode the original file with an erasure code [43,54], authenticate the blocks of the encoded file, and then
upload them on the storage server. With this technique, the server has to delete or modify a considerable
number of blocks to actually delete or modify a data block. This ensures that all blocks of the file are
retrievable from the responses of the server which passes an audit with some non-negligible probability.
Following the work by Juels and Kaliski, several POR schemes have been proposed [12,22,58,13,57,15,3].
Some of these schemes are designed for static data, and the rest allow the client to modify data after
the initial outsourcing.
As we deal with a single cloud server in this work, we only mention some secure cloud storage
protocols in a distributed setting. Some of them include the works by Curtmola et al. [19] (using
replication of data) and Bowers et al. [11] (using error-correcting codes and erasure codes). Dimakis et
al. [21] introduce network coding in distributed storage systems where linear combinations of data blocks
are disseminated to multiple servers. In terms of repair bandwidth (bandwidth required to repair a failed
server), this technique is more efficient than using the conventional erasure codes for distributing the
blocks. For such a distributed storage system, there are schemes for remote integrity checking [17,40,50]
designed to achieve fast repair of a failed server.
We define an SCS protocol for dynamic data (DSCS) below [25]. A DSCS protocol can be either a
PDP or a POR protocol depending upon the retrievability guarantee for the outsourced data file. The
protocol can be privately verifiable if the verification algorithm of the protocol involves the secret key sk
of the client; it is publicly verifiable, otherwise. In general, the term verifier is used to denote an auditor
for a secure cloud storage. The client (for a privately verifiable protocol) or a third party auditor (for a
publicly verifiable protocol) can act as the verifier.
Definition 2 (Secure Cloud Storage for Dynamic Data). A secure cloud storage protocol for
dynamic data (DSCS) consists of the following procedures.
– DSCS.KeyGen(1λ): This procedure generates a secret key-public key pair K = (sk, pk) for the client.
– DSCS.Outsource(F,K,m, fid): The client splits the file F associated with the file identifier fid
into m blocks and computes authentication tags for these blocks using her secret key sk. Then, she
constructs an authenticated data structure M on the authentication tags (for checking freshness of
the data) and computes some metadata dM for M . Finally, the client uploads the file F
′ (the file F
and the authentication tags) along with M to the cloud storage server and stores dM (and m) at her
end.
– DSCS.AuthRead(i, F ′,M, pk, fid): When the client wants to read the i-th block, the server sends to
the client the i-th block vi, its authentication tag ti and a proof Π(i) (related to M) for ti.
– DSCS.VerifyRead(i, pk, sk, vi, ti, Π(i), fid): After receiving (vi, ti, Π(i)), the client checks if ti is a
valid tag for vi and if Π(i) corresponds to the latest metadata dM (included in pk). The client
outputs 1 if both of them are satisfied; she outputs 0, otherwise.
– DSCS.InitUpdate(i, updtype, dM ,m, fid): The value of the variable updtype indicates whether the
update is an insertion (after) or a modification (of) or the deletion of the i-th block. Depending on
the value of updtype, the client modifies (m, dM ) at her end and asks the server to perform the
required update on the file associated with fid (related information specified in info).
– DSCS.PerformUpdate(i, updtype, F ′,M, info,m, fid): The server performs the update on the file
associated with fid and sends the client a proof Π.
– DSCS.VerifyUpdate(i, updtype, Π,m, fid): On receiving the proof Π for the file associated with fid
from the server, the client checks whether Π is a valid proof.
– DSCS.Challenge(pk, l, fid): During an audit, the verifier sends a challenge set Q of cardinality
l = O(λ) to the server.
– DSCS.Prove(Q, pk, F ′,m, fid): The server, after receiving the challenge set Q, computes a proof of
storage T corresponding to Q and a proof of freshness Π. Then, it sends (T,Π) to the verifier.
– DSCS.Verify(Q, T,K,m, fid): The verifier checks if T is a valid proof of storage corresponding to
the challenge set Q and Π is a valid proof of freshness. The verifier outputs 1 if both the proofs pass
the verification; she outputs 0, otherwise.
A secure cloud storage for dynamic data consists of the following protocols: Init, Read, Write and Audit.
The protocol Init consists of the procedures DSCS.KeyGen and DSCS.Outsource. The protocol Read in-
cludes the procedures DSCS.AuthRead and DSCS.VerifyRead. DSCS.InitUpdate, DSCS.PerformUpdate
and DSCS.VerifyUpdate comprise the protocol Write. A write (or update) operation can be an insertion
(after) or a modification (of) or a deletion of the i-th block of the data file. The protocol Audit (challenge-
response) consists of DSCS.Challenge, DSCS.Prove and DSCS.Verify. In the procedure DSCS.Verify, the
value of K¯ is either sk or pk depending on whether the DSCS protocol is privately verifiable or publicly
verifiable, respectively. We know that DSCS protocols based on PDP (provable data possession) guar-
antee the extraction of almost all the blocks of the file F . On the other hand, DSCS protocols based on
POR (proofs of retrievability) ensure the extraction of all the blocks of F with the help of erasure codes.
A detailed description of the security of a DSCS protocol (with PDP guarantees) is given in Section 4.
2.7 Secure Cloud Storage Protocol for Static Data Using an SNC Protocol
Chen et al. [18] propose a generic construction of a secure cloud storage protocol for static data (SSCS)
from a secure network coding (SNC) protocol. They consider the data file F to be stored on the server
to be a collection of m blocks or vectors (each of dimension n). The underlying idea is to store these
vectors (without augmenting them with unit vectors) along with their authentication tags on the server.
Computing these tags exploits the tag-generation procedure (SNC.TagGen) of the SNC protocol (see
Definition 1 in Section 2.5). During an audit, the client sends an l-element subset of the set of indices
{1, 2, . . . ,m} to the server. The server augments those vectors with the corresponding unit vectors,
combines them linearly in an authenticated fashion (using the procedure SNC.Combine) and sends
the output vector along with its tag to the client. Finally, the client verifies the authenticity of the
received tag with respect to the received vector (using the procedure SNC.Verify). We briefly discuss
the procedures involved in the general construction of a secure cloud storage protocol for static data
(SSCS) as follows.
– SSCS.KeyGen(1λ,m, n): Initially, the client executes SNC.KeyGen(1λ,m, n) to generate a secret
key-public key pair K = (sk, pk).
– SSCS.Outsource(F,K,m, n, fid): The file F associated with a random file identifier fid consists of
m vectors each of them having n segments. We assume that each of these segments is an element
of F. Then, for each 1 6 i 6 m, the i-th vector vi is of the form [vi1, . . . , vin] ∈ F
n. For each
vector vi, the client forms ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m by augmenting the vector vi with the unit coeffi-
cient vector ei. Let V ⊂ F
n+m be the linear subspace spanned by u1, u2, . . . , um. The client runs
SNC.TagGen(V, sk,m, n, fid) to produce an authentication tag ti for the i-th vector ui for each
1 6 i 6 m. Finally, the client uploads the file F ′ = {(vi, ti)}16i6m to the server.
– SSCS.Challenge(pk, l,m, n, fid): During an audit, the verifier selects I which is a random l-element
subset of [1,m]. Then, she generates a challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I , where each νi
R
←− F. The verifier
sends the challenge set Q to the server.
– SSCS.Prove(Q, pk, F ′,m, n, fid): Upon receiving the challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I for the file identi-
fier fid, the cloud server, for each i ∈ I, forms ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m by augmenting the vector vi with
the unit coefficient vector ei. Then, the cloud server runs SNC.Combine({ui, ti, νi}i∈I , pk,m, n, fid)
to produce another vector w ∈ Fn+m (along with its authentication tag t) such that w =
∑
i∈I νi · ui.
Let y ∈ Fn be the first n entries of w. The server sends T = (y, t) to the verifier as a proof of storage
corresponding to the challenge set Q.
– SSCS.Verify(Q, T, K¯,m, n, fid): The verifier uses Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I and T = (y, t) to reconstruct the
vector w ∈ Fn+m, where the first n entries of w are same as those of y and the (n + i)-th entry is
νi if i ∈ I (0 if i 6∈ I). The verifier runs SNC.Verify(w, t, K¯,m, n, fid) and returns the output of the
procedure SNC.Verify.
2.8 Authenticated Data Structures Used in DSCS Protocols
Existing DSCS protocols use authenticated data structures to ensure that the server stores the latest
version of the client’s data. Some of these authenticated data structures found in the literature are Merkle
Fig. 3. The structure of a rank-based authenticated skip list
The skip list is built on an ordered list {t1, . . . , t9}. The root node of the skip list is r. The rank of each
node in the list is written inside it. The elements are in the bottom-level (Level 0) nodes, and the root node
r resides in the highest level (Level 3). The search path for the third element t3 and the verification path for
the fifth element t5 are shown.
hash trees [45], rank-based authenticated skip lists [25] and rank-based RSA trees [52,25]. Erway et
al. [24,25] propose rank-based authenticated skip lists based on labeled skip lists [32,53] (Figure 3 depicts
the structure of a rank-based authenticated skip list). We choose this authenticated data structure (over
variants of Merkle hash trees) in order to verify the freshness of data in our DSCS protocol due to the
following reason. In the dynamic versions of Merkle hash trees (for example, authenticated red-black
trees), a series of insertions after a particular location makes the tree imbalanced and increases the
height of the tree by the number of such insertions. In the two-party model as in our case, no efficient
rebalancing techniques (for updating the authentication information of the affected nodes) for such a
tree have been studied [25].
On the other hand, due to the properties of a skip list [53], the number of levels in a skip list is
logarithmic in m with high probability. For this reason, the size of a proof, the computation time for the
server and the verification time for the client are O(logm) with high probability. We discuss briefly the
procedures of a rank-based authenticated skip list stored remotely in a server as follows. We refer [25]
for a detailed description of the same.
– ListInit(t1, . . . , tm): Let {t1, . . . , tm} be an ordered list of m elements on which a rank-based au-
thenticated skip list M is to be built. These elements are kept in the bottom-level nodes of the skip
list in an ordered fashion. For each node z of the skip list: right(z) and down(z) are two pointers
to the successors of z, rank(z) is the number of bottom-level nodes reachable from z (including z
if z itself is a bottom-level node), high(z) and low(z) are the indices of the leftmost and rightmost
bottom-level nodes reachable from z, f(z) is the label associated with the node z, and l(z) is the
level of z (l(z) = 0 for a bottom-level node z).
Initially, all these information (except the label) are computed for each node in the skip list. In
addition, the i-th bottom-level node z contains x(z) = ti, ∀i ∈ [1,m]. Finally, for each node z, the
label f(z) is computed using a collision-resistant hash function h as
f(z) =


0, if z is null
h(l(z)||rank(z)||x(z)||f(right(z))), if l(z) = 0
h(l(z)||rank(z)||f(down(z))||f(right(z))), if l(z) > 0.
(1)
Figure 3 illustrates a rank-based authenticated skip list for an ordered list {t1, . . . , t9}.
The rank-based authenticated skip list along with m elements and all the associated information
are stored in the server. The client stores only the value of m and the label of the root node r (i.e.,
f(r)) as the metadata dM .
– ListAuthRead(i,m): When the client wants to read the i-th element ti, the server sends the requested
element along with a proof Π(i) to the client. The server computes the proof Π(i) as follows.
Let the verification path of the i-th element be a sequence of nodes z1, . . . , zk, where z1 is the
bottom-level node storing the i-th element and zk = r is the root node of the skip list (see Figure 3).
Then, the proof Π(i) is of the form
Π(i) = (A(z1), . . . , A(zk)), (2)
where A(z) = (l(z), q(z), d(z), g(z)). Here, l(z) is the level of the node z, d(z) is 0 (or 1) if down(z)
(or right(z)) points to the previous node of z in the sequence, and q(z) and g(z) are the rank and
label (respectively) of the successor node of z that is not present on the verification path.
– ListVerifyRead(i, dM , ti, Π(i),m): Upon receiving the proof (ti, Π(i)) from the server, the client
checks if the proof corresponds to the latest metadata dM stored at her end. The client outputs 1 if
the proof matches with the metadata; she outputs 0, otherwise.
– ListInitUpdate(i, updtype, dM , t
′
i,m): An update can be an insertion after or a modification of or
the deletion of the i-th bottom-level node. The type of the update is stored in a variable updtype.
The client defines j = i (for an insertion or modification) or j = i − 1 (for a deletion). She calls
ListAuthRead(j,m) for the existing skip listM and verifies the response sent by the server by calling
ListVerifyRead(j, dM , tj , Π(j),m). If the proof does not match with the metadata dM (the label of
the root node of the existing skip listM), she aborts. Otherwise, she uses the proof Π(j) to compute
the metadata d′M that would be the new label of the root node if the server performs the update
correctly and updates the value ofm (if required). The client stores d′M at her end temporarily. Then,
she asks the server to perform the update specifying the location i, updtype (insertion, deletion or
modification) and the new element t′i (null for deletion).
– ListPerformUpdate(i, updtype, t′i,M): Depending on the value of updtype, the server performs the
update asked by the client, computes a proof Π similar to the one generated during ListAuthRead
and sends Π to the client.
– ListVerifyUpdate(i, updtype, t′i, d
′
M , Π,m): On receiving the proofs from the server, the client verifies
the proof Π and computes the new metadata dnew based on Π . If d
′
M = dnew and Π is a valid proof,
the client sets dM = d
′
M , deletes the temporary value d
′
M and outputs 1. Otherwise, she changes m
to its previous value, deletes d′M and outputs 0.
Due to the collision-resistance property of the hash function h that is used to generate the labels of
the nodes of the skip list, the server cannot pass the verification (during a read or an update) without
storing the element ti correctly, except with some probability negligible in λ.
3 Construction of a DSCS Protocol Using a Secure Network Coding
Protocol
We recall that Chen et al. [18] propose a generic construction of a secure cloud storage protocol for
static data from a secure network coding (SNC) protocol (this is discussed in Section 2.7). For this
purpose, they consider the data file F to be stored on the server to be a collection of m blocks or
vectors. Then, they exploit the procedures SNC.TagGen, SNC.Combine and SNC.Verify of the SNC
protocol to construct such a secure cloud storage protocol for static data.
In a secure network coding protocol, the number of vectors in the file to be transmitted through
the network is fixed. This is because the length of the coefficient vectors used to augment the original
vectors has to be determined a priori. That is why, a general construction of a secure cloud storage
protocol as discussed in Section 2.7 is suitable for static data. On the other hand, in a secure cloud
storage protocol for dynamic data, clients can update (insert, delete and modify) their data after they
upload them to the cloud server initially. In Section 3.1, we discuss whether we can provide a general
framework for constructing an efficient and secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data (DSCS) from
an SNC protocol. In Section 3.2, we propose a concrete construction of a DSCS protocol (DSCS I) that
is based on an SNC protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [14].
3.1 On the General Construction of an Efficient DSCS Protocol from an SNC Protocol
In a secure network coding (SNC) protocol, an authentication tag is associated with each vector such
that the integrity of a vector can be verified using its tag (by the receiver node or by an intermediate
node). The SNC protocols found in the literature use homomorphic MACs [1] or homomorphic signa-
tures [16,9,29,6,14].3 We identify some challenges towards providing a generic construction of an efficient
DSCS protocol from a SNC protocol (using the idea for static data mentioned above). We describe these
challenges as follows.
1. The DSCS protocol must handle the varying values of m appropriately. In the network coding proto-
cols mentioned above, the sender splits the file into m vectors (or blocks) and augments them with
unit coefficient vectors before sending them into the network. The length of these coefficient vectors
is m which remains constant during transmission. On the other hand, in a secure cloud storage for
dynamic data, the number of vectors may vary (for an insertion and a deletion). We note that,
during an audit, the verifier selects a random l-element subset I ⊂ [1,m] of indices as the challenge,
and the server augments these l vectors with corresponding unit coefficient vectors of dimension m
before generating the proof. Therefore, the server needs to keep the latest value of m in order to
generate these coefficient vectors on-the-fly during an audit.
For a privately verifiable DSCS protocol, the client keeps the up-to-date value of m. For a publicly
verifiable DSCS protocol, the client includes the value of m in her public key and updates its value
for each authenticated insertion and deletion. Thus, its latest value is known to the third party
auditor as well. We assume that, for consistency, the client (data owner) does not update her data
during an audit.
2. The index of a vector should not be embedded in its authentication tag. In an SNC protocol, the file
to be transmitted is divided into m vectors v1, v2, . . . , vm, where each vi ∈ F
n for i ∈ [1,m] (F is
replaced by Z in [29]). The sender augments each vector to form another vector ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
for i ∈ [1,m], where ei is the m-dimensional unit vector containing 1 in i-th position and 0 in others.
Let V ⊂ Fn+m be the linear subspace spanned by these augmented basis vectors u1, u2, . . . , um. The
sender authenticates the subspace V by authenticating these augmented vectors before transmitting
them to the network [16,1,9,29,14]. In a scheme based on homomorphic MACs, the sender generates
a MAC for the i-th basis vector ui and the index i serves as an input to the signing algorithm
of the MAC (for example, i is an input to the pseudorandom function used to generate the MAC
in [1]). On the other hand, for the schemes based on homomorphic signatures, the sender generates
a signature ti on the i-th basis vector ui. In some schemes based on homomorphic signatures, the
index i is embedded in the signature ti on the i-th augmented vector. For example, H(fid||i) is
embedded in ti [9,29], where fid is the file identifier and H is a hash function modeled as a random
oracle. Section 6.1 gives a brief overview of the scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [9] and shows how
each ti includes the value H(fid||i) (see Eqn. 7).
These schemes are not suitable for the construction of an efficient DSCS protocol due to the following
reason. For dynamic data, the client can insert a vector in a specified position or delete an existing
vector from a specified location. In both cases, the indices of the subsequent vectors are changed.
Therefore, the client has to download all these subsequent vectors and compute fresh authentication
tags for them before uploading the new vector-tag pairs to the cloud server. This makes the DSCS
protocol inefficient. However, in a few schemes, instead of hashing vector indices as in [9,29], there
is a one-to-one mapping from the set of indices to some group [16,14], and these group elements
are made public. This increases the size of the public key of these schemes. However, an efficient
DSCS protocol can be constructed from them. In fact, we construct a DSCS protocol (described
in Section 3.2) based on the SNC protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [14]. We note that Chen et
al. [18] construct a secure cloud storage protocol from the same SNC protocol, but for static data
only.
3. The freshness of data must be guaranteed. The freshness of storage requires that the server is storing
an up-to-date version of the data file. For dynamic data, the client can modify an existing vector.
However, a malicious cloud server may discard this change and keep an old copy of the vector. As
3 We exclude, in our discussion, the work of Attrapadung and Libert [6] as their scheme is not efficient due to
its reliance on (inefficient) composite-order bilinear groups.
the old copy of the vector and its corresponding tag are valid, the client has no way to detect if the
cloud server is storing the latest copy.
We ensure the freshness of the client’s data, in our DSCS construction, using a rank-based authen-
ticated skip list built over the authentication tags for the vectors. In other words, the authenticity
of the vectors is maintained by their tags, and the integrity of the tags is in turn maintained by the
skip list. When a vector is inserted (or modified), its tag is also updated and sent to the server. The
server updates the skip list accordingly. While deleting a vector, the server simply removes the cor-
responding tag from the skip list. Finally, the server sends to the client a proof that it has performed
the required updates properly. We briefly discuss, in Section 2.8, about rank-based authenticated
skip lists that we use in our constructions.
In addition, it is often desired that a DSCS protocol has the following property.
4. Public verifiability For a publicly verifiable DSCS protocol, any third party auditor (TPA) with the
knowledge of some public parameters can perform audits on the client’s behalf. In a secure network
coding protocol built on homomorphic MACs, some secret information (for example, the secret key
of the pseudorandom function in [1]) is needed to verify the authenticity of an incoming vector. This
property restricts the secure cloud storage protocol built using such an SNC protocol to be privately
verifiable only.
3.2 DSCS I: A DSCS Protocol Using an SNC Protocol
In this section, we construct a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data (DSCS I) from the secure
network coding (SNC) protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [14] which is secure in the standard model.4
DSCS I uses a rank-based authenticated skip list to ensure the freshness of the dynamic data. Let h
be the collision-resistant hash function used in the rank-based authenticated skip list we use in our
construction. We assume that the file F to be outsourced to the server is a collection of m vectors
(or blocks, according to Definition 2) each of dimension n. We note that a data block is the unit the
file is split into, such that an authentication tag is assigned to each block (thus, in this paper, a block
represents a vector). We call each of the n components of a vector a segment. We assume that each such
segment is λ bits long. We provide a detailed description of the DSCS I procedures as follows. We note
that the procedures KeyGen, Outsource, Prove and Verify in DSCS I call the procedures SNC.KeyGen,
SNC.TagGen, SNC.Combine and SNC.Verify (respectively) of the underlying SNC protocol [14] along
with performing other operations related to the skip list.
– KeyGen(1λ,m, n): The client selects two random safe primes5 p, q and takes N = pq (such that N
provides λ bits of security when used as an RSA modulus). The client chooses a random prime e of
length λ+1 (in bits) and sets the file identifier fid = e. She selects g, g1, . . . , gn, h1, . . . , hm
R
←− Z∗N .
The secret key sk is (p, q), and the public key pk consists of (N, e, g, g1, . . . , gn, h1, . . . , hm, dM ,m, n).
Initially, dM is null. Let K = (sk, pk).
– Outsource(F,K, fid): The file F (associated with the identifier fid) consists of m vectors each of
them having n segments such that each segment is a bit-string of length λ (an element of Fe). Then,
for each 1 6 i 6 m, the i-th vector vi is of the form [vi1, . . . , vin] ∈ F
n
e . For each vector vi, the client
selects a random element si
R
←− Fe and computes xi such that
xei = g
si(
n∏
j=1
g
vij
j )hi mod N. (3)
Now, ti = (si, xi) acts as an authentication tag for the vector vi. The client constructs a rank-based
authenticated skip listM on the authentication tags {ti}16i6m and computes the metadata dM (the
4 Random oracle model [8] is a model of computation that assumes the existence of a truly random function,
and a cryptographic scheme is proven secure in this model assuming a cryptographic hash function used in the
scheme to be a truly random function. On the other hand, the standard model (or plain model) is a model of
computation where the security of a cryptographic scheme relies only on some complexity assumptions (e.g.,
discrete logarithm assumption [44]).
5 A safe prime is a prime of the form 2p′ + 1, where p′ is also a prime.
label of the root node of M). Finally, the client updates dM in the public key pk and uploads the
file F ′ = {(vi, ti)}16i6m along with M to the cloud server.
– AuthRead(i, F ′,M, pk, fid): In order to read the i-th vector, the client executes ListAuthRead(i,m)
for the skip list M stored on the server. The server sends to the client the i-th vector vi, its
authentication tag ti and the skip-list proof Π(i) for ti (see Section 2.8).
– VerifyRead(i, pk, sk, vi, ti, Π(i), fid): Upon receiving vi = [vi1, . . . , vin], ti = (si, xi) and Π(i) from
the server, the client checks if ListVerifyRead(i, dM , ti, Π(i),m)
?
= 1 and if
xei
?
= gsi(
n∏
j=1
g
vij
j )hi mod N. (4)
The client outputs 1 if both of the equalities hold; she outputs 0, otherwise.
– InitUpdate(i, updtype, pk, fid): The value of the variable updtype indicates whether the update is
an insertion after or a modification of or the deletion of the i-th vector. The client performs one of
the following operations depending on the value of updtype.
1. If updtype is insertion, the client selects h′
R
←− Z∗N and generates the new vector-tag pair (v
′, t′).
She runs ListInitUpdate on (i, updtype, dM , t
′,m) and sends (h′, v′) to the server.
2. If updtype is modification, the client generates the new vector-tag pair (v′, t′). Then, the client
runs ListInitUpdate(i, updtype, dM , t
′,m) and sends v′ to the server.
3. If updtype is deletion, the client runs ListInitUpdate(i, updtype, dM , t
′,m), where t′ is null.
The client stores the value of the new metadata d′M temporarily at her end.
– PerformUpdate(i, updtype, F ′,M, h′, v′, t′, pk, fid): We assume that, for efficiency, the server keeps
a local copy of the ordered list of hj values for 1 6 j 6 m. Based on the value of updtype, the server
performs one of the following operations.
1. If updtype is insertion, the server sets m = m+1, inserts h′ in the (i+1)-th position in the list of
hj values (for 1 6 j 6 m) and inserts v
′ after the i-th vector. The server runs ListPerformUpdate
on the input (i, updtype, t′,M).
2. If updtype is modification (h′ is null), the server modifies the i-th vector to v′ and runs the
procedure ListPerformUpdate on (i, updtype, t′,M).
3. If updtype is deletion (h′, v′ and t′ are null), the server sets m = m − 1, deletes the partic-
ular hi value from the list of hj values (j ∈ [1,m]) and runs ListPerformUpdate on the input
(i, updtype, null,M).
– VerifyUpdate(i, updtype, t′, d′M , Π, pk, fid): After receiving the proof from the server, the client
performs ListVerifyUpdate(i, updtype, t′, d′M , Π,m). If the output of ListVerifyUpdate is 1, the client
outputs 1 and updates her public key (the latest values of m, dM and hj for j ∈ [1,m]) accordingly.
Otherwise, the client outputs 0.
– Challenge(pk, l, fid): During an audit, the verifier selects I, a random l-element subset of [1,m].
Then, she generates a challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I , where each νi
R
←− Fe. The verifier sends the
challenge set Q to the cloud server.
– Prove(Q, pk, F ′,M, fid): After receiving the challenge setQ = {(i, νi)}i∈I , the cloud server computes
s =
∑
i∈I νisi mod e and s
′ = (
∑
i∈I νisi−s)/e. The server, for each i ∈ I, forms ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
e
by augmenting the vector vi with the unit coefficient vector ei. Then, it computes w =
∑
i∈I νi ·
ui mod e ∈ F
n+m
e , w
′ = (
∑
i∈I νi · ui − w)/e ∈ F
n+m
e and
x =
∏
i∈I x
νi
i
gs′
∏n
j=1 g
w′
j
j
∏m
j=1 h
w′
n+j
j
mod N. (5)
Let y ∈ Fne be the first n entries of w and t = (s, x). The server sends T = (T1, T2) as a proof of
storage corresponding to the challenge set Q, where T1 = (y, t) and T2 = {(ti, Π(i))}i∈I .
– Verify(Q, T, pk, fid): Using Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I and T = (T1, T2) sent by the server, the verifier con-
structs a vector w = [w1, . . . , wn, wn+1, . . . , wn+m] ∈ F
n+m
e , where the first n entries of w are same
as those of y and the (n+ i)-th entry is νi if i ∈ I (0 if i 6∈ I). The verifier checks if, for each i ∈ I,
Π(i) is a valid proof (with respect to dM ) for ti = (si, xi). Then, she computes s¯ =
∑
i∈I νisi mod e
and verifies whether s¯
?
= s. Finally, she checks if the following equality holds
xe
?
= gs
n∏
j=1
g
wj
j
m∏
j=1
h
wn+j
j mod N. (6)
The verifier outputs 1 if the proof passes all the verifications; she outputs 0, otherwise.
DSCS I is publicly verifiable as only the knowledge of the public key pk enables one to perform
an audit on the client’s behalf. A write (comprising the procedures InitUpdate, PerformUpdate and
VerifyUpdate) and an audit (comprising the procedures Challenge, Prove and Verify) must be performed
atomically. Additionally, a write and an audit must not coincide in order to maintain the consistency of
the outsourced data.
Correctness of Verification Eqn. 6 For each i ∈ I, the vector vi is augmented with ei to form
ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
e . So, we can rewrite Eqn. 3 as
xei = g
si(
n∏
j=1
g
vij
j )hi mod N = g
si
n∏
j=1
g
uij
j
m∏
j=1
h
ui(n+j)
j mod N.
Now, for an honest server storing the challenged vectors correctly, we have
xe =
∏
i∈I (x
e
i )
νi(
gs′
∏n
j=1 g
w′
j
j
∏m
j=1 h
w′
n+j
j
)e mod N
=
∏
i∈I
(
gsi
∏n
j=1 g
uij
j
∏m
j=1 h
ui(n+j)
j
)νi
(
gs′
∏n
j=1 g
w′j
j
∏m
j=1 h
w′n+j
j
)e mod N
=
g
∑
i∈I νisi
∏n
j=1 g
∑
i∈I
νiuij
j
∏m
j=1 h
∑
i∈I
νiui(n+j)
j(
gs′
∏n
j=1 g
w′
j
j
∏m
j=1 h
w′
n+j
j
)e mod N
= g
∑
i∈I
νisi−es
′
n∏
j=1
g
∑
i∈I
νiuij−ew
′
j
j
m∏
j=1
h
∑
i∈I
νiui(n+j)−ew
′
n+j
j mod N
= gs
n∏
j=1
g
wj
j
m∏
j=1
h
wn+j
j mod N.
Therefore, the proofs provided by an honest server always pass the verification Eqn. 6.
4 Security of DSCS I
We recall that a secure DSCS protocol must have the following properties [25,57]. A formal security
model is described in Section 4.1.
1. Authenticity Authenticity of data requires that the cloud server cannot produce a valid proof of
storage T ′ (corresponding to the challenge set Q) without storing the challenged vectors and their
respective authentication information untampered, except with a probability negligible in λ.
2. Freshness Freshness of data guarantees that the server is storing an up-to-date version of the
data file F .
3. Retrievability Retrievability of data requires that, given a probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary A that can respond correctly to a challenge Q with some non-negligible probability, there exists
a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the challenged vectors (except
with negligible probability) by challenging A for a polynomial (in λ) number of times and verifying
the responses sent by A. The algorithm E has a rewinding access to A. Authenticity and freshness of
data restrict A to produce valid responses (without storing the authenticated and up-to-date data)
during these interactions only with some probability negligible in λ.
4.1 Security Model
The DSCS I protocol offers the guarantee of dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) [25]. We describe
the data possession game of DPDP between the challenger (acting as the client) and the adversary (acting
as the cloud server) as follows.
– The challenger generates a secret key and public parameters, and she gives public parameters to the
adversary. The adversary selects a file F associated with the identifier fid to store. The challenger
processes the file to form another file F ′ with the help of the secret key and returns F ′ to the
adversary. The challenger stores only some metadata to verify the updates to be performed by the
adversary later.
– The adversary adaptively chooses a sequence of operations defined by {opi}16i6q1 (q1 is polynomial
in the security parameter λ), where opi is an authenticated read, an authenticated update (write) or
an audit. The challenger executes these operations on the file stored by the adversary. For an update
operation defined by (updtype, info), the challenger verifies the proof (sent by the adversary) by
running VerifyUpdate and updates her metadata if and only if the proof passes the verification. The
adversary is notified about the result of the verification for each operation.
– Let F ∗ be the final state of the file after q1 operations. The challenger has the latest metadata for
the file F ∗. Now, she challenges the adversary with a random challenge set Q, and the adversary
returns a proof T = (T1, T2) to the challenger. The adversary wins the game if the proof passes the
verification. The challenger can challenge the adversary q2 (polynomial in λ) times in an attempt to
extract (at least) the challenged vectors of F ∗.
Definition 3 (Security of Dynamic Provable Data Possession). A dynamic provable data pos-
session scheme is secure if, given any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can win the data
possession game mentioned above with some non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time
extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the challenged vectors of the file by interacting (via
challenge-response) with A polynomially many times.
4.2 Security Analysis of DSCS I
We state and prove the following theorem in order to analyze the security of DSCS I.
Theorem 1. Given that the hash function used to construct the rank-based authenticated skip list is
collision-resistant and the underlying network coding scheme is secure, the DSCS I protocol described in
Section 3.2 is secure in the standard model according to Definition 3.
Proof. We use the following claims in order to prove Theorem 1.
Claim 1 Given that the hash function used to construct the rank-based authenticated skip list is collision-
resistant and the underlying network coding scheme is secure, the authenticity of the data file is guar-
anteed in DSCS I.
Proof. Authenticity of data demands that the cloud server, without storing the challenged vectors and
their respective authentication tags appropriately, cannot produce a valid response T ′ = (T ′1, T
′
2) =
((y′, t′), T ′2) for a challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I during the data possession game (and during the ex-
traction phase). The data file F with a random (but unique) fid is identified by the augmented vectors
ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
e for i ∈ [1,m]. Let T = (T1, T2) = ((y, t), T2) be the response computed honestly for
the same challenge set Q; thus, Verify(Q, T, pk, fid) = 1. We consider the following two cases where we
prove that the adversary can generate neither a valid T ′1 (Case I) nor a valid T
′
2 (Case II).
Case I We show that if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can break the
authenticity of DSCS I, the security of the underlying SNC protocol is compromised.
If possible, we assume that, when challenged with Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I during the data possession game
or the extraction phase, the adversary A produces a valid (but incorrect) response T ′ = (T ′1, T2) =
((y′, t′), T2) such that y
′ 6= y (where T = (T1, T2) = ((y, t), T2) is the correct response). As T
′ is a valid
response, Verify(Q, T ′, pk, fid) = 1. Let w = [w1, . . . , wn, wn+1, . . . , wn+m] ∈ F
n+m
e be a vector, where
the first n entries of w are same as those of y and the (n + i)-th entry is νi if i ∈ I (0 if i 6∈ I). Let
w′ = [w′1, . . . , w
′
n, w
′
n+1, . . . , w
′
n+m] ∈ F
n+m
e be another vector, where the first n entries of w
′ are same as
those of y′ and the (n+i)-th entry is νi if i ∈ I (0 if i 6∈ I). Clearly, w 6= w
′ (as y 6= y′). We observe that the
procedure Verify executes the procedure SNC.Verify (see Eqn. 6 in Section 3.2). As Verify(Q, T ′, pk, fid)
outputs 1, it follows that SNC.Verify(w′, t′, pk,m, n, fid) = 1 (otherwise, the procedure Verify would
output 0). We consider only the case where y 6= y′. We do not take into account the case where y = y′
but t 6= t′, since the tag for a vector y is unique (in this case, SNC.Verify(y, t′, pk,m, n, fid) outputs 0
— which implies that Verify(Q, T ′, pk, fid) also outputs 0).
We also note that, for a given challenge set Q, the set of indices I and the corresponding coefficients νi
(for i ∈ I) are randomly chosen by the challenger (data possession game) or by the extractor (extraction
phase). As the correct values of the basis vectors u1, . . . , um for F are unique at a given point of time,
their linear combination using fixed coefficients (i-th coefficient is νi or 0 depending on whether i ∈ I or
i 6∈ I) is also unique. This unique linear combination is w (6= w′). As the last m entries of w′ are same
as those of w, it follows that w′ 6∈ span(u1, . . . , um).
To sum up, the pair (w′, t′) thus constructed for F (identified by fid) satisfies the following condi-
tions: [w′n+1, w
′
n+2, . . . , w
′
n+m] ∈ F
m
e is not equal to the all-zero vector 0
m, SNC.Verify(w′, t′, pk,m, n, fid)
outputs 1 and w′ 6∈ span(u1, . . . , um). This implies a type-2 forgery on the network coding protocol [14]
we use in DSCS I (security of an SNC protocol is discussed in Section 2.5). However, since this net-
work coding protocol is secure in the standard model, the adversary cannot produce such a response
T ′1 = (y
′, t′), except with some probability negligible in the security parameter λ.
Case II In DSCS I, the hash function h used to compute the labels of the nodes in the rank-based
authenticated skip listM is collision-resistant (see Section 2.8). To produce a valid skip-list proof T ′2 6= T2
with respect to the latest metadata dM (the label of the root node of the skip list), the adversary has
to find a collision for the hash function h in some level of the rank-based authenticated skip list. As h is
taken to be collision-resistant, the adversary can forge a skip-list proof only with a probability negligible
in λ.
This completes the proof of Claim 1. 
Claim 2 Given that the hash function used to construct the rank-based authenticated skip list is collision-
resistant, the freshness of the data file is guaranteed in the DSCS I protocol.
Proof. Freshness of the data file is maintained using the rank-based authenticated skip list built over
the authentication tags. For each update request made by the adversary during the data possession
game, the challenger runs the procedure InitUpdate (which in turn calls the procedure ListInitUpdate
described in Section 2.8) to compute the new metadata d′M from the skip-list proof Π provided by
the adversary. After the adversary performs the update, it sends another proof Π ′ corresponding to
the updated skip list. Then, the challenger runs the procedure VerifyUpdate (which in turn calls the
procedure ListVerifyUpdate) to compute dnew from Π
′ and to check if d′M
?
= dnew . The challenger
updates the latest metadata dM = d
′
M if and only if d
′
M = dnew and Π
′ is a valid proof. If the adversary
is able to make the challenger output 1 during some execution of VerifyUpdate without storing the
latest authentication tags, then it must have found a collision for the hash function h in some level of
the rank-based authenticated skip list. However, as h is taken to be collision-resistant, this event (forging
a skip-list proof) occurs with a negligible probability.
On the other hand, for each audit during the data possession game or the extraction phase, freshness
of authentication tags is guaranteed by checking the validity of the skip-list proof T2 = {(ti, Π(i))}i∈I
with respect to the latest metadata dM (using the procedure Verify). The output of Verify is 1 if and
only if T2 is a valid skip-list proof. Again, if the adversary is able to forge a skip-list proof (with respect
to dM ) without storing the latest authentication tags, then it must have found a collision for the hash
function h in some level of the rank-based authenticated skip list — which occurs only with a negligible
probability.
Finally, although the correct value of the set of basis vectors u1, . . . , um for F is unique at a given
point of time, it is changed for each update. The malicious adversary might discard modifications of some
of these vectors and keep an older version of them (along with up-to-date authentication tags). Thus,
when challenged for some of these vectors, the adversary provides a proof T1 = (y, t) = (y, (s, x)) which
is correct but computed on older data. We note that the procedure Verify computes s¯ =
∑
i∈I νisi mod e
(si values are obtained from T2 = {(ti, Π(i))}i∈I) and checks whether s¯ is equal to s (s is a part of T1).
However, as the coefficients νi in the challenge set Q are randomly chosen by the challenger, the value
of s would be equal to s¯ =
∑
i∈I νisi mod e only with probability 1/e which is again negligible in λ
(since e = Θ(2λ+1)).
This completes the proof of Claim 2. 
We define a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the challenged vectors
(except with negligible probability) by interacting with an adversary A that wins the data possession
game mentioned above with some non-negligible probability. As DSCS I satisfies the authenticity and
freshness properties mentioned above, A cannot produce a proof T = (T1, T2) for a given challenge set
Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I without storing the challenged vectors and their corresponding tags properly, except
with some negligible probability. This means that if the output of the procedure Verify is 1 during the
extraction phase, the vector y in the proof is the linear combination of the original data vectors vi for
i ∈ I using coefficients {νi}i∈I .
Suppose the extractor E wants to extract l vectors indexed by J . It challengesA with Q = {(i, νi)}i∈J .
If the proof is valid (checked using Verify), E initializes a matrix ME as [ν1i]i∈J , where ν1i = νi for each
i ∈ J . The extractor challenges A for the same J but with different random coefficients. If the procedure
Verify outputs 1 and the vector of coefficients is linearly independent to the existing rows of ME , then
E appends this vector to ME as a row. The extractor E runs this procedure until the matrix ME has l
linearly independent rows. So, the final form of the full-rank matrix ME is [νji]j∈[1,l],i∈J . Therefore, the
challenged vectors can be extracted with the help of Gaussian elimination.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Probabilistic Guarantees If the cloud server corrupts a constant (say, β) fraction of vectors present in a
data file, then the server passes an audit with probability pcheat = (1 − β)
l, where l is the cardinality
of the challenge set Q. The probability pcheat is very small for large values of l. Typically, l is taken to
be O(λ) in order to make the probability pcheat negligible in λ. Thus, the verifier detects a malicious
server corrupting β-fraction of the data file with probability pdetect = 1 − pcheat = 1 − (1 − β)
l, and it
guarantees the integrity of almost all vectors of the file.
5 Performance Analysis of DSCS I
In this section, we discuss the (asymptotic) performance of our DSCS I protocol (described in Section 3.2)
and compare this protocol with other secure cloud storage protocols achieving provable data possession
guarantees. We also discuss some limitations of DSCS I compared to DPDP I [24]. We provide detailed
implementation and experimental results for DSCS I in Section 7.2.
5.1 Efficiency of DSCS I
The computational cost of the procedures in DSCS I is dominated by the cost of exponentiations (modulo
N). To generate the value x in an authentication tag for each vector (in the procedure Outsource), the
client has to perform a multi-exponentiation6 and calculate the e-th root of the result (see Eqn. 3).
The server requires two multi-exponentiations to calculate the value of x (see Eqn. 5 in the procedure
Prove). To verify a proof using the procedure Verify, the verifier has to perform a multi-exponentiation
and a single exponentiation (see Eqn. 6). As mentioned in Section 2.8, due to the properties of a skip
list [53], the size of each proof Π (related to the rank-based authenticated skip list), the time required
to generate Π and the time required to verify Π are O(logm) with high probability.
As DSCS I protocol provides provable data possession (PDP) guarantees, we compare our scheme
with some other PDP schemes found in the literature. The comparison shown in Table 1 is done based
on different parameters related to an audit. In Section 6, we propose a more efficient scheme suitable
for append-only data that we mention as DSCS II in Table 1.
5.2 Limitations of DSCS I
We discuss a few limitations of DSCS I compared to DPDP I [24] (specifically) as both of them handle
dynamic data, offer public verifiability and are secure in the standard model (DPDP I is briefly discussed
in Appendix C). We state the limitations of DSCS I compared to DPDP I as follows.
6 A naive way to compute a product of the form
∏
k
i=1 a
ei
i
in a finite group is to multiply the results of the
individual exponentiations. There are better algorithms for computing such a multi-exponentiation [46].
Table 1. Comparison among secure cloud storage schemes achieving PDP guarantees
Secure cloud Type Computation Computation Client-server
Publicly Security
storage of for for communication
verifiable model
protocols data verifier server bandwidth
PDP
Static O(1) O(1) O(1) Yes RO†
[4]
Scalable PDP
Dynamic‡ O(1) O(1) O(1) No RO
[5]
DPDP I
Dynamic O(log m˜) O(log m˜) O(log m˜) Yes§ Standard
[24]
DPDP II
Dynamic O(log m˜) O(m˜ǫ log m˜)⋆ O(log m˜) Yes§ Standard
[24]
Wang et al.
Dynamic O(log m˜) O(log m˜) O(log m˜) Yes RO
[61]
Wang et al.
Dynamic O(log m˜) O(log m˜) O(log m˜) Yes RO
[60]
FlexDPDP
Dynamic O(log m˜) O(log m˜) O(log m˜) Yes§ Standard
[26]
Chen et al.
Static O(1) O(1) O(1) Yes Standard
[18]
DSCS I
Dynamic O(logm) O(logm) O(logm) Yes Standard
(our scheme)
DSCS II
Dynamic¶ O(1) O(1) O(1) Yes RO
(our scheme)
For simplicity, we exclude the security parameter λ from complexity parameters (for an audit). The value m˜
denotes the number of blocks the data file is split into (such that an authentication tag is associated with each
block). For example, m˜ = m in our DSCS (I and II) schemes, where m denotes the number of vectors. The
term O(n˜) is added implicitly to each complexity parameter, where n˜ is the size of each block. For example,
n˜ = n in DSCS I and II, where a vector having n segments is considered to be a block. For all the schemes,
the storage at the verifier side is O(1), and the storage at the server side is O(|F ′|) where F ′ is the outsourced
file. If l is the cardinality of the challenge set and the server corrupts β fraction of the file, the detection
probability pdetect = 1− (1− β)
l for all the schemes (except, in DPDP II, pdetect = 1− (1− β)
Ω(log m˜)).
† RO denotes the random oracle model [8].
‡ Scalable PDP scheme supports (block-wise) deletion, modification and append operations; insertion of a
block in an arbitrary location of the data file is not supported in this scheme.
§ Although the authors do not claim explicitly the public verifiability of the scheme, we observe that the
scheme can be made publicly verifiable by simply making the metadata d
M˜
of the up-to-date skip list and
the value m˜ public (see Footnote 2 in Section 2.6).
⋆ ǫ is a constant such that 0 < ǫ < 1.
¶ DSCS II supports only append operations; (arbitrary) insertion, deletion and modification operations are
not supported.
1. The size of the public key is O(m + n) in DSCS I. On the other hand, the size of the public key in
the DPDP I scheme is constant.
2. The authentication tags in DSCS I are of the form (s, x), where s ∈ Fe and x ∈ Z
∗
N . An authentication
tag in DPDP I is an element of Z∗N . Thus, the size of a tag in DSCS I is larger than that in DPDP
I by λ+ 1 bits (as e is a (λ+ 1)-bit prime).
3. In DSCS I, the value of (dM ,m) and the hi values in the public key must be changed for each
insertion or deletion (a modification requires changing only the value of dM ), whereas only the value
of (dM˜ , m˜) needs to be changed in DPDP I. However, if the server keeps a local copy of the public
key (an ordered list containing hi values for i ∈ [1,m]), then small changes are required at the server
side. The server inserts the new h value (sent by the client) in (i + 1)-th position in the list (for
insertion) or discards the i-th h value (for deletion).
Thus, the proposed DSCS I scheme suffers from the limitations mentioned above. We note that the
existing secure cloud storage protocol for static data [18] based on the same SNC protocol [14] also
suffers from the first two of these limitations. However, in this paper, we explore whether a secure cloud
storage protocol for dynamic data can be constructed from a secure network coding protocol. A more
efficient (in terms of the size of the public key or the size of an authentication tag) SNC protocol can
lead to the construction of a more efficient DSCS protocol (with the help of the techniques described
in this paper). In the following section, we propose another secure cloud storage protocol (DSCS II) for
append-only data that is much more efficient than DSCS I.
6 More Efficient Solutions for Append-only Data
Although dynamic data are generic in that they support arbitrary insertion, deletion and modification
operations, append-only data find numerous applications as well. These applications primarily include
storing archival data from different sources where data are appended to the existing datasets. For
example, data obtained from closed circuit television camera, monetary transactions in banks, medical
history of patients — all must be kept intact with append being the only possible update. Append-only
data are also useful for maintaining other log structures (e.g., certificates are stored using append-only
log structures in certificate transparency schemes [39]).
In this section, we identify SNC protocols [9,29] that are suitable for append-only data, and we
construct a more efficient DSCS scheme (DSCS II) for append-only data using the SNC protocol proposed
by Boneh et al. [9]. As we have discussed in Section 3.1, this SNC protocol is not suitable for constructing
an efficient secure cloud storage for generic dynamic data as the block-indices are embedded in the tags.
However, this issue does not arise for append-only data where the data blocks (or vectors) are appended
at the end (thus index of a new block does not affect that of an existing block). Moreover, unlike [14],
the size of the public key in [9] does not depend on the value of m, the number of vectors in the
data file. These two crucial observations lead us to construct a more efficient SNC-based DSCS scheme
for append-only data (specifically). In this section, we first give a brief overview of the SNC protocol
proposed by Boneh et al. [9]. Then, we describe the construction of the DSCS II scheme.
6.1 A Homomorphic Signature Scheme for Network Coding Proposed by Boneh,
Freeman, Katz and Waters
Boneh et al. [9] propose a homomorphic signature scheme for network coding that is secure in the
random oracle model [8] under the co-computational Diffie Hellman (co-CDH) assumption. Let G =
(G1, G2, GT , e, ψ) be a bilinear group tuple, where G1, G2 and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of
prime order p, and the functions e : G1 × G2 → GT (bilinear map) and ψ : G2 → G1 are efficiently
computable (see Section 2.4). Then, the co-computational Diffie Hellman (co-CDH) problem in (G1, G2)
is to compute gx ∈ G1 given g, h and h
x, where g ∈ G1 and h, h
x ∈ G2 (for some x ∈ Zp).
We say that the co-CDH assumption holds in (G1, G2) if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A(1λ), the probability
Pr
g
R
←−G1
h,z
R
←−G2
[a← A(g, h, z = hx) : a = gx]
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A and the random
choices of g, h and z. We briefly describe the procedures involved in this scheme [9].
– KeyGen(1λ,m, n): Let G = (G1, G2, GT , e, ψ) be a bilinear group tuple, where G1, G2 and GT are
multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p > 2λ, and the functions e : G1 × G2 → GT (bilinear
map) and ψ : G2 → G1 are efficiently computable. Choose g1, . . . , gn
R
←− G1\{1}, h
R
←− G2\{1} and
α
R
←− Fp. Take z = h
α. Let H : Z × Z → G1 be a hash function considered to be a random oracle.
The public key is pk = (G, H, g1, . . . , gn, h, z), and the private key is sk = α.
– TagGen(V, sk,m, n, fid): Given the secret key sk, a linear subspace V ⊂ Fn+mp spanned by the
augmented vectors u1, u2, . . . , um and a random file identifier fid ∈ {0, 1}
λ, the sender outputs the
signature ti =
(
m∏
j=1
H(fid||j)ui(n+j)
n∏
j=1
g
uij
j
)α
for the i-th basis vector ui = [ui1, ui2, . . . , ui(n+m)] ∈
F
n+m
p for each i ∈ [1,m].
– Combine({yi, ti, νi}16i6l, pk,m, n, fid): Given the public key pk, the file identifier fid and l tuples
(each consisting of a vector yi ∈ F
n+m
p , a coefficient νi ∈ Fp and a signature ti), an intermediate
node outputs the signature t =
∏l
i=1 t
νi
i for another vector w =
l∑
i=1
νi · yi ∈ F
n+m
p .
– Verify(w, t, pk,m, n, fid): Given the public key pk, the unique file identifier fid, a signature t and
a vector w = [w1, w2, . . . , wn+m] ∈ F
n+m
p , an intermediate node or the receiver node checks whether
e(t, h)
?
= e

 m∏
j=1
H(fid||j)wn+j
n∏
j=1
g
wj
j , z

 .
If the equality holds, it outputs 1; it outputs 0, otherwise.
We recall that in a secure cloud storage protocol (using secure network coding), the client divides the
file F associated with fid into m vectors (or blocks) each of them having n segments. The i-th vector
vi is of the form [vi1, . . . , vin] ∈ F
n, ∀i ∈ [1,m]. For each vector vi, the client forms ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
by augmenting the vector vi with the unit coefficient vector ei. If we use the current SNC protocol [9],
the client runs TagGen(V, sk,m, n, fid) to produce a signature (authentication tag)
ti =

 m∏
j=1
H(fid||j)ui(n+j)
n∏
j=1
g
uij
j


α
=

H(fid||i) n∏
j=1
g
uij
j


α
=

H(fid||i) n∏
j=1
g
vij
j


α
,
(7)
for each vector ui (i ∈ [1,m]). We observe that the vector index i is embedded in the tag corresponding
to the i-th vector. Therefore, the scheme is not suitable for construction of a secure cloud storage for
dynamic (in generic sense) data as mentioned in Section 3.1.
6.2 DSCS II: An Efficient DSCS Scheme for Append-only Data
From the previous section, we note that the authentication tags in the SNC protocol [9] are independent
of the value m (see Eqn. 7). The size of the public key also does not depend on m. This makes the SNC
protocol suitable for constructing a more efficient DSCS scheme. However, as each authentication tag
embeds the index of the respective vector, we cannot insert or delete at arbitrary positions of the data
file. Since the value of the index i of the vector to be inserted only increases for append-only data, the
SNC protocol provides an efficient DSCS protocol (DSCS II). We observe that, for the same reason, the
SNC protocol proposed by Gennaro et al. [29] can also be used for such a construction. We also note
that, as append is the only operation (on the data file) we consider here, we do not require the freshness
property (described in Section 3.1 and Section 4). This is due to the fact that existing data blocks are
never updated for an append operation, and there is no older (but valid) versions of a data block that
the server can retain. DSCS II consists of the following procedures.
– KeyGen(1λ,m, n): Let G = (G1, G2, GT , e, ψ) be a bilinear group tuple, where G1, G2 and GT
are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p > 2λ, and the functions e : G1 × G2 → GT
(bilinear map) and ψ : G2 → G1 are efficiently computable. The client selects g1, . . . , gn
R
←− G1\{1},
h
R
←− G2\{1} and α
R
←− Fp. She takes z = h
α and chooses a random file identifier fid ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Let H : Z × Z → G1 be a hash function considered to be a random oracle. The public key is
pk = (G, H, g1, . . . , gn, h, z,m, n), and the private key is sk = α. Let K = (sk, pk).
– Outsource(F,K, fid): The file F (associated with the identifier fid) consists of m vectors each of
them having n segments. We assume that each of these segments is an element of Fp. Then, for
each 1 6 i 6 m, the i-th vector vi is of the form [vi1, . . . , vin] ∈ F
n
p . For each vector vi, the client
computes the authentication tag
ti =

H(fid||i) n∏
j=1
g
vij
j


α
(8)
as shown in Eqn. 7. The client uploads the file F ′ = {(vi, ti)}16i6m to the cloud server.
– AuthRead(i, F ′, pk, fid): In order to read the i-th vector, the client sends the index i to the server.
The server sends to the client the i-th vector vi and its authentication tag ti.
– VerifyRead(i, pk, sk, vi, ti, fid): Upon receiving vi = [vi1, . . . , vin] and ti from the server, the client
checks whether
ti
?
=

H(fid||i) n∏
j=1
g
vij
j


α
. (9)
The client outputs 1 if the equality holds; she outputs 0, otherwise.
– InitUpdate(pk, fid): The client generates the new vector-tag pair (v′, t′) and sends it to the server.
She sets m = m+ 1 in pk.
– PerformUpdate(F ′, v′, t′, pk, fid): The server inserts v′ after the m-th vector (i.e., at the end of the
data file) and sets m = m+ 1.
– Challenge(pk, l, fid): During an audit, the verifier selects I, a random l-element subset of [1,m].
Then, she generates a challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I , where each νi
R
←− Fp. The verifier sends the
challenge set Q to the cloud server.
– Prove(Q, pk, F ′, fid): Upon receiving the challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I , the cloud server, for each
i ∈ I, forms ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
p by augmenting the vector vi with the unit coefficient vector ei.
Then, it computes the authentication tag
t =
∏
i∈I
tνii (10)
for another vector w =
∑
i∈I νi · ui ∈ F
n+m
p . Let y ∈ F
n
p be the first n entries of w. The server sends
T = (y, t) as a proof of storage corresponding to the challenge set Q.
– Verify(Q, T, pk, fid): Using Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I and T = (y, t) sent by the server, the verifier constructs
a vector w = [w1, . . . , wn, wn+1, . . . , wn+m] ∈ F
n+m
p , where the first n entries of w are same as those
of y and the (n+ i)-th entry is νi if i ∈ I (0 if i 6∈ I). Finally, the verifier checks if the equality
e(t, h)
?
= e

 m∏
j=1
H(fid||j)wn+j
n∏
j=1
g
wj
j , z

 (11)
holds or not. The verifier outputs 1 if the equality holds; she outputs 0, otherwise.
Correctness of Verification Eqn. 11 For each i ∈ I, the vector vi is augmented with ei to form
ui = [vi ei] ∈ F
n+m
e . So, we can rewrite Eqn. 8 as
ti =

H(fid||i) n∏
j=1
g
vij
j


α
=

 m∏
j=1
H(fid||j)ui(n+j)
n∏
j=1
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Now, for an honest server storing the challenged vectors correctly, we have
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Substituting the value of t in e(t, h), we get
e(t, h) = e
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Therefore, the proofs provided by an honest server always pass the verification Eqn. 11.
Observations We make the following observations regarding our DSCS II construction.
– The DSCS II scheme supports only append at the end of the data file.
– The scheme is publicly verifiable in the sense that anyone with the knowledge of the public key can
perform an audit.
– As we have discussed earlier, since DSCS II supports only append operations on the data file,
the freshness property is not required in DSCS II. Thus, DSCS II does not need authenticated
data structures (e.g., rank-based authenticated skip lists employed in DSCS I) in order to achieve
freshness of data. Therefore, we do not require the procedure VerifyUpdate in DSCS II.
– The scheme is secure in the random oracle model (according to Definition 3 in Section 4). The
security proof of DSCS II is similar to that of our DSCS I protocol (see Theorem 1), except the
freshness property that we do not require in DSCS II. Moreover, the guarantee of authenticity in
DSCS II comes from the security of the underlying SNC protocol [9] that is secure in the random
oracle model.
Efficiency While executing the procedure Outsource, the client has to perform a multi-exponentiation
to generate the value of an authentication tag for each vector t (see Eqn. 8). The server requires one
multi-exponentiation to calculate the value of t (see Eqn. 10 in the procedure Prove). The verifier has
to perform two multi-exponentiations and two pairing operations (see Eqn. 11) to verify a proof using
the procedure Verify. We note that each of the parameters — the size of a proof, the time required to
generate a proof and the time required to verify a proof — is constant (independent of m) in DSCS
II. Different efficiency parameters of the scheme (DSCS II) related to an audit are shown in Table 1
(Section 5.1). Detailed experimental evaluation of DSCS II is given in Section 7.3.
An authentication tag t in DSCS II belongs to G1, and thus is 2λ bits long [28]. The DSCS II scheme
for append-only data overcomes some of the limitations of our DSCS I protocol described in Section 3.2
as follows.
1. In DSCS II, the size of the public key is O(n) (which is O(m + n) in DSCS I), where n (≪ m) is
fixed during the setup and kept unchanged during the execution of the protocol.
2. In DSCS II, only the value of m needs to be changed for an append operation that is similar to
DPDP I [24].
7 Experimental Results
In this section, we build prototypes to evaluate the performance of our publicly verifiable secure cloud
storage schemes for dynamic data (DSCS I) and append-only data (DSCS II), respectively. The proto-
types emulate a client-server model where the client (data owner) uploads her data to a remote storage
server and later sends some queries (challenge) to the server in order to check integrity of the outsourced
data. The server responds by sending proofs for the queried data blocks. These proofs can be verified
by the client or a third party auditor (TPA) using the public information available.
7.1 Evaluation Methodology
For the performance evaluation of our DSCS schemes, we take into consideration three main parameters,
viz., storage overhead (for the server), communication bandwidth (between the client and the server)
and computation cost (for both the client and the server). The experiments are performed on a 2.5 GHz
Intel i5 processor with 8GB RAM. To implement cryptographic operations, we use the OpenSSL library
(version 1.0.2) [51] for DSCS I and the pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library (version 0.5.14) [42] for
DSCS II. We note that, as we use two different cryptographic libraries to implement DSCS I and DSCS
II, the computation time taken by similar cryptographic operations (e.g., random number generation)
varies for these schemes.
Table 2. File parameters for DSCS I and DSCS II
File size n′ m
(MB) (block size in KB) (number of blocks)
1 500 3
10 500 21
50 500 101
200 500 401
500 500 1000
In our experiments, we consider data files of various sizes as shown in the Table 2. Each file comprises
m data blocks (or vectors) each of size n′. We note that each data block in DSCS I and DSCS II comprises
n of data segments. Thus, n′ = n×sseg, where sseg is the size of each data segment. In our experiments,
we fix the value of n′ (block size) to be 500 KB, and thus the value of m (number of blocks) varies
for files according to their size. Table 2 shows the values of different parameters we have considered.
We use these values in our experiments, except the comparison given in Table 6 and Table 7. The
security parameter λ is taken to be 112. The results reported in the following sections are taken to be
the respective average by running the corresponding experiments 50 times. During an update (and an
audit), the communication cost reported in this work includes only the size of tags and the size of proofs.
We note that all of these procedures need to communicate a block (of constant size) also. For the ease
of comparison, we do not take the block size into consideration (similar to [18]). The computation cost
at the server side includes disk I/Os in order to access and update the data file (if required).
7.2 Experimental Results for DSCS I
In this section, we evaluate the performance of DSCS I. We take p and q to be 1024-bit large prime
numbers for the security parameter λ = 112.
Storage Overhead The client (data owner) only needs to store her secret key and the metadata (the
root-digest of the skip list outsourced to the server). This incurs a constant storage cost at the client side.
On the other hand, the server needs to store, along with the data file, all the authentication information
which includes the rank-based authenticated skip list and the authentication tags corresponding to the
blocks of the data file. This accounts for a storage overhead for the server.
Table 3. Storage overhead in server for DSCS I
File size Cost for skip list Cost for tags Total storage cost Storage
(MB) (KB) (KB) (KB) overhead
1 0.22 0.81 1.03 0.10%
10 3.08 5.67 8.75 0.09%
50 11.98 27.27 39.25 0.08%
200 45.58 108.27 153.86 0.08%
500 112.34 270.00 382.34 0.08%
The experimental results for storage overhead (with respect to the file size) are shown in Table 3.
We observe that the percentage of additional storage cost remains almost constant with increasing file
size when the block size n′ is fixed. Thus, the server bears a trivial storage overhead even after taking
dynamic operations into consideration.
Communication Cost The client and the server need to communicate with each other either during
an audit or during updates like insertions, deletions and modifications.
Table 4. Communication cost for DSCS I
File size Number of blocks Audit Insert Modify Delete
(MB) queried during an audit (|Q|) (KB) (KB) (KB) (KB)
1 2 3.58 2.54 2.28 2.00
10 10 16.83 2.54 2.28 2.00
50 10 16.83 2.54 2.28 2.00
200 112 185.74 2.54 2.28 2.00
500 112 185.74 2.54 2.28 2.00
During an audit, the communication cost depends on the number of challenged blocks (i.e., |Q|)
which is a small constant length query. In response to the challenge, the server sends proofs to the
client for queried data blocks. The proof size in DSCS I depends on two factors: the size of a constant
aggregated block (along with that of an aggregated tag) and the size of the skip-list proofs corresponding
to the queried blocks. The second factor brings some variation in the proof size depending on the number
of blocks queried. As we later compare the performance of DSCS I with that of [18], we do not report
the size of a block in the communication cost (similar to [18]). From Table 4, we observe that, in spite
of having data dynamics, DSCS I consumes low communication bandwidth.
During an update, the communication cost depends on the type of update being performed. For an
insertion, the client sends to the server an index, a public parameter h, the new data block along with
its tag. For a modification, client only needs to send an index, the modified data block and its tag.
For a deletion, the communication includes only the index of the block to be deleted. For each of these
updates, the server returns a proof (of update) to the client. The communication cost is reported in
Table 4 for each type of updates.
Computation Cost We report the computation cost incurred in the following phases of DSCS I:
outsourcing (preprocessing of the data file by the client), challenge generation (by the client), proof
generation (by the server), proof verification (by the client), and updates on the outsourced file (by the
client and the server). The time for outsourcing includes splitting the file into blocks, tag computation
for each block and building a skip list on these tags.
Table 5. Computation cost for DSCS I
File size Outsource # of blocks Challenge Proof Verify Insert Delete Modify
(MB) (sec) queried during (msec) (sec) (sec) (sec) (msec) (sec)
an audit (|Q|) Client Server Client Server Client Server
1 10.03 2 0.01 9.52 5.15 5.50 0.01 1.10 14.00 5.41 0.01
10 100.08 10 0.02 9.58 5.00 5.49 0.10 1.20 99.70 5.39 0.11
50 501.30 10 0.02 9.76 5.07 5.46 0.49 1.60 488.90 5.45 0.49
200 2008.93 112 0.23 14.63 5.08 5.50 6.29 1.70 6287.00 5.50 6.28
500 5717.74 112 0.79 15.61 5.07 5.52 13.04 1.60 13016.90 5.45 13.00
The experimental results have been shown in Table 5. It is evident that the initial outsourcing of the
data file is computationally expensive, but it is a one-time process. It grows as the file size increases.
It depends on several factors like the block size n′, the number of blocks m in a file and the number of
segments n in each block. Given a data file and the size of each segment in a block, if n′ is taken to be
large, the computation time for generating a single tag increases as there are more segments per block
(i.e., more components in each vector). On the other hand, if n′ is taken to be small, the time taken for
computing all the tags (and building the skip list) increases as the number of blocks m increases (thus
the number of tags for the same file increases as well). Therefore, an appropriate value results in a good
trade-off between them.
The time for challenge generation is small as much computation is not involved in this phase. Proof
generation time does not depend on the file size but on the number of blocks queried. This includes
both the time for generating an aggregated block (along with the aggregated tag) and the time for
computing the skip-list proof for each challenged block. The time for proof verification includes the time
for matching the aggregated block with the aggregated tag and the time for verifying the skip-list proof
for each challenged block. The computation time for updates is shown in Table 5 for the client and the
server separately.
Comparison between DSCS I and Existing SNC-based Secure Cloud Storage Chen et al. [18]
use the SNC protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [14] to construct a secure cloud storage for static
data. Our DSCS I construction for dynamic data also exploits the same SNC protocol. We prepare two
comprehensive comparison tables (Table 6 and Table 7) by taking results from the work of Chen et
al. [18] (reported for a 3.1 GHz Intel i3 processor with 4GB RAM) and the results obtained from our
experiments. The experiments are done for the same values of parameters (the file size and the values
of n′ and m) as reported in [18]. Table 6 shows that, for the same parameters, the computation cost for
DSCS I is much less than that for [18]. This is possibly due to the difference in the architectures these
two schemes are implemented on. Here, we have considered only the cost for initial outsourcing and an
audit (as [18] does not support updates on the data file).
Table 6. Comparison based on computation cost
File size n′ m
Outsource (sec) Challenge (msec) Prove (sec) Verify (sec)
[18] DSCS I [18] DSCS I [18] DSCS I [18] DSCS I
1.45 MB 1 KB 1488 1119.60 30.78 0.04 0.24 0.93 0.08 0.73 0.04
23.5 MB 1 KB 24089 18409.61 1144.91 2.00 0.25 1.01 0.11 0.77 0.04
121 MB 1 MB 122 87137.90 1222.60 0.38 0.23 970.69 29.29 738.41 10.34
432 MB 1 MB 433 325039.36 4463.70 4.20 0.22 976.57 30.19 741.24 10.62
From Table 7, we observe that our DSCS I scheme demands, compared to [18], some extra storage that
is attributed to the skip list (for handling the dynamic data efficiently). This results in a slight increase
in the storage overhead at the server side. During an audit, [18] requires a (constant) communication
bandwidth of 376 B for different file sizes (as the proof consists of an aggregated block and its tag).
On the other hand, the proof sent by the server in DSCS I includes not only an aggregated block (and
its tag) but also a skip-list proof for each of the queried blocks. This results in higher communication
bandwidth required for an audit in DSCS I (the figures reported in Table 7 are taken for the challenge
Table 7. Comparison based on storage overhead and communication cost
File size n′ m
Storage overhead Communication cost (during audit)
[18] DSCS I [18] DSCS I
1.45 MB 1 KB 1488 0.54 MB 0.58 MB 376 B 185.74 KB
23.5 MB 1 KB 24089 8.68 MB 8.86 MB 376 B 185.74 KB
121 MB 1 MB 122 0.04 MB 0.05 MB 376 B 185.74 KB
432 MB 1 MB 433 0.16 MB 0.17 MB 376 B 185.74 KB
size |Q| = 112). However, this higher communication cost is expected and justified as DSCS I handles
data dynamics.
Table 8. Storage overhead in server for DSCS II
File size Storage Cost for tags Storage
(MB) (KB) overhead
1 0.39 0.04%
10 2.751 0.03%
50 13.23 0.03%
200 52.53 0.03%
500 131.00 0.03%
Table 9. Communication cost for DSCS II
File size Number of blocks Audit Append
(MB) queried during an audit (|Q|) (B) (B)
1 2 131 131
10 10 131 131
50 10 131 131
200 112 131 131
500 112 131 131
7.3 Experimental Results for DSCS II
For DSCS II, we use the same parameters for different files as shown in Table 2. The additional storage
cost (storage overhead with respect to the file size) for DSCS II accounts for the tags for the data blocks
and the skip list built on these tags. They are reported separately in Table 8. After the initial outsourcing
of the data file, the client and the server need to communicate with each other either during an audit or
during an append. The communication cost during an audit includes the size of the aggregated tag (and
the size of the aggregated block that is not reported here). The communication costs for an audit and an
append are reported in Table 9. Table 10 summarizes the computation cost for DSCS II incurred during
the initial outsourcing, an audit and an append. We note that the time needed to generate a tag is much
more expensive (compared to DSCS I) due to the costly operations in bilinear groups implemented using
the PBC library.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data (DSCS I) based on a
secure network coding (SNC) protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first SNC-based DSCS
protocol that is secure in the standard model and enjoys public verifiability. We have also discussed
about some challenges while constructing, in general, an efficient DSCS protocol from an SNC protocol.
We have analyzed the efficiency of our DSCS construction and compare it with other existing secure
cloud storage protocols achieving the guarantees of provable data possession. We have also identified
Table 10. Computation cost for DSCS II
File size Outsource Number of blocks Challenge Proof Verify Append (sec)
(MB) (sec) queried during an audit (msec) (sec) (sec) Client Server
1 154.05 2 0.09 0.12 0.02 65.75 0.02
10 1459.06 10 0.32 0.75 0.03 65.49 0.24
50 7212.21 10 0.47 0.79 0.05 65.45 1.15
200 28600.80 112 3.78 12.85 0.37 65.34 8.90
500 96001.83 112 4.43 13.49 0.39 65.51 20.40
some limitations of an SNC-based secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data. However, some of
these limitations follow from the underlying SNC protocols used. A more efficient SNC protocol can
give us a DSCS protocol with better efficiency. We have also identified an SNC protocol suitable for
append-only data and constructed a more efficient DSCS scheme (DSCS II) for append-only data. We
have shown that DSCS II overcomes some limitations of DSCS I. Finally, we have provided prototype
implementations of DSCS I and DSCS II in order to show the practicality of our schemes.
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Appendix
A Digital Signatures
Diffie and Hellman introduce the public-key cryptography and the notion of digital signatures in their
seminal paper “New Directions in Cryptography” [20]. Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [55] propose the
first digital signature scheme based on the RSA assumption. Following that, several signature schemes
are proposed [23,35,10].
We define a digital signature scheme as proposed by Goldwasser et al. [31]. A digital signature
scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms: a key generation algorithm KeyGen, a
signing algorithm Sign and a verification algorithm Verify. The algorithm KeyGen takes as input the
security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (psk, ssk), where ssk is the secret key and psk is the
corresponding public key (verification key). The algorithm Sign takes a message m from the message
spaceM and the secret key ssk as input and outputs a signature σ. The algorithm Verify takes as input
the public key psk, a message m and a signature σ, and outputs accept or reject depending upon
whether the signature is valid or not. Any of these algorithms can be probabilistic in nature. A digital
signature scheme has the following properties.
1. Correctness : The algorithm Verify always accepts a signature generated by an honest signer, that
is,
Pr[Verify(psk,m, Sign(ssk,m)) = accept] = 1.
2. Security: Let Signssk(·) be the signing oracle and A be any probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary with an oracle access to Signssk(·). The adversary A makes polynomial number of sign queries
to Signssk(·) for different messages and gets back the signatures on those messages. The signature
scheme is secure if A cannot produce, except with some probability negligible in λ, a valid signa-
ture on a message not queried previously, that is, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
ASignssk(·), the following probability
Pr[(m,σ)← ASignssk(·)(1λ) : m 6∈ Qs ∧ Verify(psk,m, σ) = accept]
is negligible in λ, where Qs is the set of queries made by A to the signing oracle Signssk(·). The
probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A and the random choice of ssk.
B Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
Message authentication codes (MACs) are symmetric-key counterpart of digital signatures. Both digital
signatures and MACs are used extensively for computing authentication tags (or digests) on messages.
These digests are publicly (or privately) verifiable when computed using a digital signature (or MAC)
scheme. The algorithms and properties of a MAC scheme are same as those for a digital signature scheme
described in Appendix A, except that the signing and verification keys are the same in a MAC scheme.
That is, the signer and the verifier need to share the secret key k. Some MAC constructions are based
on pseudorandom functions (e.g., XOR MAC [7], CMAC [48]); some of them are based on cryptographic
hash functions (e.g., HMAC [49]).
C DPDP I: A Dynamic Provable Data Possession Scheme
Erway et al. [25,24] propose two efficient and fully dynamic provable data possession schemes: DPDP
I (based on rank-based authenticated skip lists) and DPDP II (based on rank-based RSA trees). We
consider only the DPDP I scheme here.
Let there be a key generation procedure KeyGen that produces a public key pk = (N, g), where
N = pq is a product of two large primes and g is an element of Z∗N with large order. Suppose the initial
data file consists of m˜ blocks b1, b2, . . . , bm˜. For each block b, the client computes a tag T (b) = g
b mod N .
Now, the client builds a rank-based authenticated skip list M˜ on the tags of the blocks and uploads the
data, tags and the skip list to the cloud server. The insertion, deletion and modification operations are
performed in a similar fashion as discussed in Section 3.2. There is no secret key involved in the DPDP
I scheme. Although Erway et al. do not claim explicitly the public verifiability of the DPDP I scheme,
we observe that the scheme can be made publicly verifiable by simply making the metadata dM˜ of the
up-to-date skip list and the value m˜ public (see the footnote in Section 2.6).
During an audit, the verifier selects I, a random l-element subset of {1, 2, . . . , m˜}, and generates a
challenge set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I , where each νi is a random value. The verifier sends the challenge set Q
to the server. The server computes an aggregated block B =
∑
i∈I νibi and sends {T (bi)}i∈I , B and
proofs {Π(i)}i∈I (see Section 2.8) to the verifier. The verifier computes T =
∏
i∈I T (bi)
νi . Finally, the
verifier accepts the proof if and only if the following two conditions hold: Π(i) is a valid proof for each
i ∈ I and T = gB mod N .
